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The major concem o f  this analysis is to search for the most 
effective institutional administrative arrangement which will improve 
the management of the KTM. The model used in this analysis was 
Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) introduced by Saaty and 
Kevin. 
The policy options considered and analyzed are: 
1. The Status Quo -FUN Government Ownership 
2. Equal Between the Federal Govcmment and a Foreign Government 
1 3. Join t-ven htre between Federal Government and a Foreign Government. 
4. Pn'vatization by Indigenous Private Investors With Government Regulations. 
5. Contracting Out to Indigenous Private Concern With a Provision of Greater 
Autonomy. 
Finally, based on the above analysis, we make a recommendation on the 
best option, i.e., to manage the KTM by indigenous privateownership (option 4). 
i INTRODUCTION 
In most 'welfare states' the provision of such services like health care, transporta- 
tion, postal services and telephones is the prerogative of the government. The involve- 
ment of goverment in such services appears to be more prevalent in the Third 
World countries due mainly to  the abject poverty of the majority of the population.' 
In Malaysia these services are normally provided through public agencies of govern- 
ment that are allowed t o  some extent to operate as commercial entities. 
I Most developing countries have acknowledged the necessity to create these 
I kind of public agencies in order to promote economic development and social welfare. 
f The prime reasons for creation of the public agencies as Samir Farid (1980) indicated, 
1 are the need to undertake massive capital development on a national or regional 
I scale; the need to ensure that some economic activities are subject to political control e 
i by the legislative and the responsible ministry and the need to  minimize economic 
L balance between the regions within the country. 
1 
.) 
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What has unfortunately emerged consistently in Malaysia particularly, is the 
tremendous in demand for resources by these public agencies. The services they 
render are quite below the original expectations. They appear to be ungovernable 
and standard bureaucratic procedures to bring them under control appears to be 
not very successful. 
One such government institution in Malaysia is the Malaysian Railway (KTM) 
which for a very long time, since the 60s has been a sick baby of the government. 
Like all other government corporations the KTM is created primarily to provide 
social services and to same degree it is also to be operated as a commercial venture. 
These conflicting goals of "commercialism and provision of social services have laways 
been a source of concern to economists and other commentators of public corpora- 
tions".* The recent shift of sentiments in favor of profit as a performance criterion 
of public agencies (not KTM alone), is occassioned by the undesirable economic 
conditions. There is also a growing anxiety concerning capital shortages, deficit fman- 
cing, inflationary pressures and the essential need for the public corporation to finance 
their own expansion and to generate earnings which may be utilized in other sectors 
of the economy. While the current motivation is geared towards greater emphasis 
on profitability, the task of reconciling the profitability motive with wider goals 
of public policy has been consistent's elusive. 
The problem of the KTM, like most public agencies is further aggravated by the 
Morrisonian Model3 of institutional administrative and managerial arrangement. In 
theory, the model advocates the separation between policymakers on the terrain of 
the management of the agencies. The end result, as with the KTM, is that despite 
millions of Ringgit which the Federal Government invest in the KTM, the agency is 
not only operating in substantial deficit but is characterized by undesirable standard 
of passengers and goods services. 
The recent idealogical motivation in the country to privatize the KTM and other 
government agencies is supported by the inability of the policy makers to design 
a viable framework of economic and financial control over public agencies. What this 
implied is that it is impossible to manage business efficiently within the public sector. 
The question to be asked is whether private sector could succeed where the govern- 
ment has been judged to have failed. Indeed, KTM is a very important public agency 
and given the disposition of the natural resources and the industries in the country 
the importance of an effective and efficient railway services to the economic develop- 
ment of the country cannot be overemphasiezed. The railway is also important for 
bringing together the diverse ethnic groups and it is also essential for national defense. 
Having assessed the role the railway plays in the nation building, there is a need to 
search for the best alternative institutional administrative arrangement with the aim 
of improving the overall social and economic roles of the KTM. The search for such 
an arrangement becomes necessary because the present predominance of government 
control and indeed the so called Morrisonial Model leave so much to be desired. In 
order to accomplish the above task, it is important to understand the background, 
the strengths and weaknesses of the present system, and the various actors and 
stakeholders involved. 
This policy paper will address the goals and formulate various policy options 
to achieve them. The policy options will be analyzed on the criteria of effectiveness, 
efficiency, consistency, political feasibility, economic feasibility and administra- 
tive feasibility. The options will be further compared quantitatively by the use of a 
txhnique known as Analytical Hierachical Process (AHP), and the option which 
meets the criteria most will be recommended. Finally, the implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of the recommended option will be addl'essed. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY PROBLEM 
Keretapi Tanah Melayu, increasingly referred to by its acronym "KTM" traces 
its origin to  the year 1885 although its corporate name is of more recent ~ i n t a g e . ~  
Proposals for the construction within the hfalay Peninsular of a rail transport system 
go back beyond date although early proposals did not envisage a countrywide railway 
system - a concept perhaps too premature for its time.' Instead local railways were 
constructed to provide a more efficient and effective means of moving bulk commodi- 
ties, mainly tin, from in land mining areas to the nearest coastal port for export. 
The earliest railway track was in fact constructed in Johore State in 1874 
to link Johore Bharu to Guriong Pulai, a distance of about 20 miles. Over 10 miles 
of track were laid but the railway never became operational and vas abandoned in 
1877. According to many Mal~ysian historists the first railway track in Malaysia 
which was inaugurated for service was between Port Weld and Taiping in the state of 
Perak in 1885. To date Malaysia Railway (KTM) has a network spread over 10 of the 
13 states of Malay~ ia .~  With it 1,685 route kilometers of meter gauge track, KTM 
carries approximately seven million passengers and four millions tonnes of freight 
per annum." For many decades since its creation, KTM has enjoyed a monopoly 
position. However, in the face of severe competition from other modes of transport, 
especially roads, which operate with a higher degree of freedom and more modern 
facilities, KTM has lost its position as a "monopolistic carrier"' and has become 
quite vulnerable. KTM is fully owned by the Federal Government with a chairman, 
Board members and the General Director, all appointed by the government. Further- 
more, the organization operates under the direction and control of Ministry of 
Transport. Indeed, like the British rail, the KTM operates on the Morrisonial Model 
which separates policy making and policy implementation. The policy maker in this 
case is the Board of Directors governed by the Minister of Ministry of Transport and 
the implementor is the KTM management. 
The important thing to note here is that the KTM which fully government 
owned is subject to various government bureaucratic entanglements. The 'arm twisting' 
of the Ministry of Transportation, the Board of Directors and the Management of 
KTM militates against the operation and management of KTM as a viable commercial 
venture. The problem facing KTM appears to lean heavily on the present institutional 
administrative arrangement which is responsible for the substantial financial losses 
and below standard services. It is considered grossly inadequate to meet the apparent 
and other latent functions of the railway. The current wave of public opinion ques- 
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tion the quality of the services provided by KTM. And there is an on-going debate 
questioning the rationale behind full government ownership KTM which is not only 
operating on large dificit annually but also it is lacking in terms of comfort facilities 
both in the train and in the station and long delay in departures and arrivals (See 
Appendix 1). The management system also lacks accuntability, stability, reliability 
and continuity which are essential attributes to any successful venture. The over- 
protectiveness which the system offers to the KTM staff encourages complacency. 
The change of ownership is likely to inject a new pattern of manangement and account- 
ability in the KTM and consequently improves its efficiency and effectiveness opera- 
tionally, technologically and politically. There is therefore, a need to quest for a viable 
institutional administrative arrangement for KTM. 
POLICY QUESTION 
The policy question therefore is: What is the best institutional administrative 
arrangement to improve the effectiveness and effeciencie of the Keretapi Tanah 
Melayu (KTM). 
ASSUMPTION 
In considering and analyzing the various policy options the following important 
assumptions are made: 
a) That the existing railway network will be maintained whatever the policy 
option adopted. 
b) That there will be local private and foreign entrepreneurs who will be interested 
in the KTM either as partners or owners. 
c) That the Federal Government will be willing to assist these private entrepreneurs 
as it is to the best interest of the government to maintain the railway networks. 
d) That the government will regulate the activities of the railways, i.e. fares in such 
a way that there would be fairness to both the public and the new owners or 
partners. 
ACTORS AND STAKEHOLDERS I 
ACTORS i l 
The manner in which the following actors and stakeholders perceive their interest 
will determine the degree to which each of the policy options would be accepted. 
These actors and stakeholders represent the policy makers, the administrators, the 
clients and the public. They variously play important and crucial parts in policy 
making, implementing and supporting the policy. 
1. The Malaysian Government. 
2. The Minister of Ministry of Transport. 
I 
3. The Minister of Ministry of Finance. 
I 
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4. The Board of Directors of KTM. 
5.  The Representatives of foreign government. 
6 .  The Representatives of indigenous and foreign enterpreneurs. 
STAKEHOLDERS 
1. All the actors. 
2. Management staff of the KTM. 
3. Employees of KTM. 
4. Malaysian public, especially the railway clients. 
POLICY OPTIONS 
Five policy options will be analyzed in the course of this problem. 
I 
I 
I OPTION 1 - THE STATUS QUO (FULL GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP) 
I 
The status quo means full government ownership of KTM as it is today. For 
objective analysis it is necessary to look at the organizational structure of KTM vis 
1 a vis operational and administrative relationship with the Ministry of Transport. 
Indeed, the understanding of the concept of its institutional administrative arrange- 
ment is also important for future evaluation. 
Malaysia in many respects is a British colonial creation and the model for 
administrative and control of public agencies is very similar to that of Britain. The 
model is based on the concept of separation between policy formulation by the 
political authorities and policy implementation by agency's management. 
Looking at the KTM, internally it is organized as shown in Appendix 2 based 
on line and staff. However, it does not enjoy much autonomy. This is due principally 
to the fact that much of the controls over general policy directions are vested in the 
Minister of Transport which are transferred to the Board of Directors. It is the Board 
of Directors under the consent of the Minister who gives effect to all directions of 
a "general character" as to the discharge of its function in relation to matters appear- 
ing to them to  be of public importance, and the KTM management is t o  give effect 
to all such directions. It is important to note that the appointments of Board of 
Directors and the General Director are all done by the government. These appoint- 
ments are more often not based on merit, but on other political reasons. 
I 
[ Indeed many writers have agreed that government has been responsible for 
many of the difficulties experience by public agencies developing countries. Indeed, 
k classical among such writers is McHenry in his article, " The Government Versus 
e Management Controversy: Ascribing Responsibility for Failure of  a Public Colpora- tion in Nigeria", which is a case study of Cross River State Agricultural Development 
9 Corporation (ADC). He contended that the real responsibility for the failure df the 
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ADC belongs with the government. He further asserted that the reasons for govern- 
ment killing its own public corporation are partly constraints imposed on it and 
partly the opposition of its supporters to public a g e n ~ y . ~  
OPTION 2 - EQUAL PARTICIPATION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERN- 
MENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR 
This option addresses the need for the KTM to be owned and operated as a 
joint venture between the Federal Government and a private sector, preferably an 
indigenous one. It means therefore, part public and part private capital will fund the 
KTM operations and development. Indeed, the concept of public and private sector 
participation in the production of goods and services is well documented in various 
public administration literature. In Britain, such public enterprises with private shares 
are called "hybrids".' O 
Applying this option to the KTM, it means that private shareholders' interest 
will be looked after by their appointed representatives. The problem however is the 
extent to which the private sector could exert influence in the decision making, most 
especially when aconomic interest is being sacrificed in the name of national interests. 
It is important that necessary safeguards be provided in this option to ensure that the 
overall national interest, the expectations of indigenous private investors for financial 
reward on capital and the govenment national transportation policy and public service 
obligations are satisfied and reconciled. 
S.M. Adams identifies there aspects of government interaction with the private 
sect0r.l 
a) The aplication of traditional governance tools such as regulation and taxation 
in new ways. 
b) The recognition of the need for the government to increasingly collaborate 
with others in pursuing social policy objectives. 
c) The recognition that secondary (or unintended) consequences of policy on the 
behaviour of individuals and markets can often have important effect on 
problems. 
OPTION 3 - JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND A 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 
Cooperation between Federal Government and Foreign Government IS not 
a new thing. Such cooperation is evident in several bilateral agreements and technical 
aids that Malaysia receives from various countries, most especially the U.S. and British. 
What is of course unique in this case is the fact that the two governments will be in 
partnership in the running and control of an indigenous organization that is of public 
interest. This option means that the foreign government would have its representatives 
in both the management and staff of KTM. Canada, Japan, India and Britain appear 
to be the most likely countries this venture. The reasons are because they all have 
nationalized railways and they have a strong diplomatic and trade relations with 
Malaysia. 
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OPTION 4 - PRIVATIZATION BY INDIGENOUS PRIVATE INVESTORS 
WITH GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
The first reason for the current preference for privatization of government 
agencies could be attributed to the failure of successive incremental measure to effec- 
tively control these agencies. These failures are interpreted as evidence not of defec- 
tive design and implementation, but of some deeper insolubility which cannot be 
remedied just by devising new system of control because "public agencies are viewed 
as a flawed instrument of public policy".'* Instead, it is argued that the public enter- 
prises themselves and searching for alternative instruments less replete with control 
dilemmas such as subsidies, regulations, and ministerial interferences. According to 
the argument, public control could thus be secured without public ownership. 
In Malaysia the current debate and demands for privatization arose from the 
disappointing performance of the public agencies. In the 1970's, commencing with the 
second Malaysia Plan, the Malaysian Government participated more directly in the 
establishment of operation of a wide range of public and private investment. The 
expansion of public sector enterprises was promoted through regulation and Govern- 
ment intervention in the economy. As a result the public sector acquired a significant 
hold over the investments and resources of the nation. £lowever, in the light of tight- 
ening of financial resources, and the need to inject dynamism and improvement of 
productivity and efficiency so that economic progress can be achieved, a reassessment 
of the trends of the public and private investments was called for.13 
Following the above reassessment, in June 1983, Y.A.B. Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamed initiated the idea of the need to privatize some of the public enterprises 
in Malaysia by formulating and adopting a Privatization Policy. The objective is to 
transfer the ownership and management of public sector enterprises, as much as feasible 
over a period of time, to the private ownership and management.14 
Increased interest in privatization of some government enterprises seems to have 
prompted by several factors; one has to do with the rapidly increasing cost of such 
services vis a vis the dwindling government resources and indeed the poor services 
offered by those enterprises. Increased interest is also attributed to several well 
publicized studies that seem to demonstrate that the private, profit making sector 
can deliver services at a cost substantially below that of public sector. A third factor 
is as Donald Fisk mentioned, "that the continuing search for a yardstick against 
which to measure the performance of the public sector. Private firms are adequately 
monitored to ensure agreed on performance can presumably offer such yardstick."15 
OPTION 5 - CONTRACTING OUT TO INDIGENOUS PRIVATE CONCERN 
WITH A PROVISION OF GREATER AUTONOMY 
The basic argument for contracting out service (like privatization) is that it 
serves as analogue to the private market, where, if competition between buyers 
and sellers exists, the market price may be taken as a measure of the benefit received. 
The premise is that when services are provided by the government, not only 
is the choice available to  the customer reduced, but competition in the production 
of the service is largely absent. At present, the KTM does not have much corporate 
autonomy. This is due principlally to  the fact that much of the controls over general 
policy directions are vested in the Ministry of Transport through the appointment of 
Board of Directors. 
Therefore, the message of this option is to reorganized the KTM by contracting 
out the managerial and administrative activities to indigenous private investors. But 
under this option, the indigenous private investors have greater autonomy in the 
management process of KTM, with respect to decision making. In other words, KTM 
will act at "arm lengths" from the government subject to the general policy direction 
by the responsible ministers only ob matters affecting the national interest. Those 
in management will be given more authority to exercise their initiative in the day to 
day management, and they should not be subjected to undue pressures by any minis- 
terial control. This important attributes for autonomy is important for the manage- 
ment of KTM because the day to day and even hour to hour decisions have to  be 
taken on spot, and fixed rules and precedents should not slavishly govern the manage- 
ment of public agencies. 
Anyhow, under this option the government still retains the ownership of infra- 
structure i.e. building, rail tracks, locomotives and other physical assets. The involve- 
ment of government in the maintenance of capital is important because the social 
obligations the government has toward the public. It is very imperative to contract 
out this operational and managerial activities to different contractors according to 
regions in order to create a competitive environment. 
Indeed, contracting out instead of privatization is proposed for KTM because 
through this option it creates an autonomous management that will improve the 
operation of KTM without changing the govelnment ownership. 
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF OPTION I 
The following criteria will be used in the selection of the option recommended. 
1. EFFECTIVENESS: the degree to which greater ability of the organization to 
utilize its outputs to accomplish its objectives and meeting the service standards 
set forth. This will be measured in terms of the extent to  which the organizatio- 
nal goals would be achieved upon the implementation of each option. 
2. EFFICIENCY: the additional cost involved is to be justified and within the 
means. This will be measured by comparing the actual costs involved both 
before and after the recommendations and comparing them with the value or 
benefit gained. 
3. CONSISTENCY: the degree which changes being instituted are consistent with 
other programs and policies and with cultural characteristics. This will be 
measured in terms of the extent to which other programs are impacted on or 
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conflicted by the proposal. 
4. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY: the degree to which political stability is promoted, 
support and cooperation are mobilised for the intended change to occur. This 
will be measured in terms of the number and intensity of support, acceptability 
and cooperation mobilised among political parties, decision makers, public 
officials, influential citizens, groups and other sources of power in the irnple- 
mentation of each option. 
5. ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY: the degree to which budgets or fund are available 
to finance the specific option. This will be measured in terms of the capacity 
of the government to provide the amount of financial support that is required 
for the implementation of each option. 
6 .  ADMINISTRATIVE FEASIBILITY: the degree to which the organization has 
the administrative capacity to implement the specific option. This will be 
measured in terms of the extent to which changes may be instituted in the 
existing administration without breeding any major difficulties and problems. 
Also, other specific criteria in evaluating administrative feasibily include autho- 
rity, institutional committment, capabihty and organizational support. 
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE POLICY OPTIONS. 
EFFECTIVENESS 
1.  Full Government Ownership - Status Quo 
The government ownership impairs the operational and administrative effective- 
ness of KTM. The appointments to the KTM executive and manegerial positions 
which are seldom done base on merits affect the employees' morale; thus affect 
the outputs of the KTM. 
The most striking facts about the KTM is that it has very dubious terms of 
reference. Its objectives are vague, unrealistically defined, and bear little relation 
to (the facts of the environment which they have to operate according to the 
needs of national development. Socially, this option may be considered effective 
because the majority of the poor can afford the fare and may not mind about 
the inefficiencies. However, since this option has been responsible for the 
dismal performance of KTM, it is the most ineffective among all other options. 
2. Joint - Venture Between Government and Indigenous Private Investor 
Through this option, the wasteful and laissez-faire attitude presently obtained 
in the KTM is most likely to be curtailed because the presence of private sector 
will act as check to the KTM management. Anyhow it is not rated high because 
there is likely a dichotomy between the government appointed representa- 
tives and those of private inverstors. The dichotomy may permeate to the 
lowest employee and may result in unhealty rivalry. Consequently, this would 
be detrimental to the KTM productivity, effectiveness and well-being. Anyhow, 
since the social and commercial obligations of the KTM are likely to be met, 
this option is better than the first option. 
interest. Therefore, it is less effective than the fourth and the fifth options. 
4. Privatization with Government Regulations 
This option is considered effective because the exposure of the KTM to the 
same climate of other business is likely to make the KTM sit up. Due to the 
business approach there would be stability, reliability, continuing to KTM 1 
management. These three attributes are essentials in any business undertaking 
in order to be viable. 
The effectiveness of this option could be enumerated base on the following 
anticipated results in the management of KTM. 
Provide better performance 
Provide specialized skills 
Avoid initial large costs 
Permits greater flexibility in adjusting program size 
Provides a yardstick for comparison 
Promotes increased objectivity 
Produce better management practices 
produce better management information system 
5. Contracting Out to Indigenous Private Concern with a Provision of Greater 
Autonomy 
This option will pursue the concept of debereaucratization of KTM; decisions 
are allowed to be made through a process that involve the indigenous private 
enterpreneurs rather than exclusively or primarily by government. Some ele- 
ments of merit will be injected in the appointment of management members. 
The staff hired by the contractor will not possessed the wasteful and laid-back 
attitude which are presently obtained in the KTM. Therefore, effective manage- 
ment, mobilization of resources, improving productivity and motivation of 
staff could be better achieved through this option as compared to the first, 
second and third options. However, this option is less effective in comparison 
to the fourth option because the government ownership of the infrastructure 
i.e. stations, rail tracks, locomotives e.t.c. will not release KTM and make way 
for the effective exploitation of unproductive assets. 
e 
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Joint-Venture Between the Federal Government and Foreign Governm 
Trough this option, the foreign government is likely to bring in technical an 
administrative expertise in the KTM. This is most likely to  improve the effecti 
ness of the KTM. This option is rated higher than the first and the se 
options, because the presence of a foreigner will ginger up the local KTM 
and management to work hard, and this may be a challenge to him to pro 
that they could measure up with their counterparts. But through this opti 
there may be a dichotomy between the two factions resulting in conflict 
B. EFFICIENCY 
1. Full Government Ownership - Status Quo 
This option will let KTM continuingly operate on a substantial deficit by pro- 
I 
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ducing poor services. The debts that KTM owned to several different sources 
which accummulates the total of more than 500 million ringgit is another factor 
that contribute to the inefficiency of this option.' Due to lack of clear grounds 
upon which KTM could be hold accountable to the government, it operates 
not as economically as it should. Resources available are frequently misused. 
Politically t h s  option is efficient because as we can understand that the govern- 
ment's ownership of the KTM is a political and social weapon in the hands of 
the government. If the ownership is structurally altered, then the public may 
not see the government as a provider of such important service; it is indeed 
politically costly. However, the miserable financial burden that the government 
has to bear makes this option less efficient than the second, fourth and fifth 
options but more efficient than the third option. 
Joint Venture Between Government and Indigenous Private Sector 
Some element of merits will be injected in the appointment of management 
members by the government to measure up with their private counterparts. 
The private sector personnel both in the management and work force, are 
likely to improve the managerial and operational services of KTM. For this 
reason, this option is better than option 1 because it will attract more customers, 
and eventually more profit will be gained. It is also better than option 3 since 
through this option, the transfer of money overseas could be reduced. 
Joint Venture Between Federal Government and Foreign Government 
Through this option, there is likely to have a substantial drain of the hard 
earned foreign exchange which is in short supply. This is so because the foreign 
staff will transfer their money overseas. In addition, the dividend accrued to 
the foreign government will have to be transferred in current exchange also. 
This option can cause a severe drawdown in the country's foreign reserve which 
further weakend the country's financial strength. Since the present economic 
condition of the country with regard to the foreign reserve is not stable, this 
option is considered the least efficient among all other options. 
Privatization by Indigenous Private Investor with Government Regulation 
Due to  the business approach there is likely an improvement of the KTM services. 
The improvement in the services will attract more customers, thus more passenger 
miles travelled, more tonne miles and consequently more revenue. The govern- 
ment is likely to benefit from the KTM financially due to annual revenue. 
The exposure of KTM to the same climate affecting other businesses is likely 
to make the KTM sit up. 
Sale and Green did a study in 1979 to compare the operating cost and perfor- 
mance of American Public Transit System. Four large transits were taken for 
comparison; Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) and Tri-Met System, Portland, 
Oregon (Tri-Met) which are both publicly owned and Transport of New Jersey 
(NJ) and New Orleans Transit Service (NOTS) which are owned by private 
investors. They found that the total annual labor cost for the two publicly- 
owened transits i.e. CTA and Tri-Met was $58,544 and for TNJ and NOTS 
iNALISIS Jld. 1, BU. 1. 
was $39,366." This means that the labor cost for publicly-owned transit system 
is 32.76 per cent more compared to transit system which is privately owned. 
According to a research team from University of Maryland, Japan implemented 
a privatization program of railway'enterprise by dividing the Japan National 
Railway of 23,000 km nertwork into six separate private railways. This privatiza- 
tion program was able to reduce the cost of production when those railways 
were under government ownership." 
From the above findings, this option is better than.the first, second and flfth 
options. 
Another point is that, due to  the constraints in foreign exchange, the local 
private investor is likely to be prompted to invest in research and development, 
most especially in the utilization of local material and skill to manufacture 
more spare parts imported. This will contribute in no small measure in the 
nation's economy and technical manpower development. With this regard, this 
option is better than the third option,. In short, this option is the most efficient 
among other options. 
Contracting out to Indigenous Private Concern With a Provision of Greater 
Autonomy 
This option is quite efficient because the competition and the profit-motive 
are presumed to 'act the same way in purchasesf-service agreements as the 
assumption that the price of a service will approach the cost of production, 
and the resulting competition should lead to a lower cost for equivalent service 
or to better performance at similar cost. 
Pucher conducted a study on 77 U.S. bus systems in 1979 and he found that 
although only 7% of the nation's service was provided by privatelyswned 
systems, but their operating cost was $1.72 per hour lower than publicly- 
owned-system systems and $0.94 per hour lower than systems that were under 
private contract management.19 
Therefore this option is better in terms of this criteria as compared to the first, 
second and third options but less than the fourth option. 
CONSISTENCY 
The Status Quo-Full Government Ownership 
This option could be considered consistent from the point of view that the 
government's control will assure consistency in public policy. But it is con- 
tradicting with the Privatization Policy that the government formulated in 1983. 
This Privatization Policy regconized that in the light of tightening of financial 
resources and the need to inject dynamism and improvement of productivity 
and efficiency of public sector enterprises, the retransfer of the investment from 
public to private investment has to be called for . This option also does not 
support the New Economic Policy (NEP) which was designed to encourage 
more local enterpreneurs to invest in the country. Therefore, this option is 
more consistent compared to the third option but less consistent than the, 
second, the fourth and the fifth options. 
, 
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Equal Between the Federal and Indigenous Private Enterprise Participation 
The presence of government (other than regulatory) is something that is most 
detested by many. Indeed, Heald and many others mentioned with pessimism 
as to how the government political objectives would be favorably reconciled 
with the corporate autonomy of the public agency and the profit motives of 
the private investors. Writing about the British hybrids, Heald maintained that 
decisions of principles on the shareholdings and the propostion were hardly 
ever explained and never convincingly justified." What really emerges ironically, 
on the definition customarily used in international comparisons, is that these 
hybrids remained public enterprises. In the case of KTM, Government policies 
despite any safeguards are likely to prevail over any agency's decisions. This 
would be inimical to the interest of the private shareholders. This situation lead 
to a conflict between public policy and the private investors. However, this 
option is rated more consistent than the first and the third option because it 
encourages more local enterpreneurs to involve in the development of national 
economy by making investment in the country. This is in line with the New 
Economic Policy. 
3. Joint-Venture Between Federal Government and a Foreign Government 
Through this option, the KTM will be forced to change its transport policy 
which may not be to the public interest. The consistency between this option 
and other policies cannot be easily achieved. This option militates against the 
fuller utilization by the indigenous investors of the many opportunities being 
opened up in the modern sectors of the economy whlch is contained in the New 
Economic Policy. Therefore, this option is the least consistent among all the 
five options. 
4. Privatization by Indigenous Private Investor With Government Regulation 
Since the government will constantly keep an eye on the indigenous private 
investors to ensure their profit motive does not constitute into exploitation of 
the general public policies, this option is rated high in terms of consistency. 
Further more, it is in line with the Privatization Policy since this government 
policy recognized that the development of the indigenous private sectors, even 
by transfer of resources from the public sector, is the fulcrum on which the 
future economic development of Malaysia will be founded. It is necessary to note 
i that liberation of market forces is an essential step that has to go with privatiza- tion. 
i This option also coincides with the New Economic Policy which sought a socio- economic environment that encourage indigenous private investors to participate, ; 
Q manage and control the economic life of the nation. 
1 Another point to consider is that, according to  Schacknies, the World Bank 
S 
y has redefined its lending strategy in support of rail projects.21 The Bank 
required the LDC governments to implement certain action plans before it will 
/ approve a loan ag~eement. One of the issues that must be address in those 
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tracts, wages and salaries of employees. Thus, by privatizing KTM, this action 
plan is meeting the requirements laid down by the World Bank in terms of 
borrowing money. 
5. Contracting Out to  Indigenous Private Concern with a Provision of Greater 
Autonomy 
Contracting process will provide standard of the work to  be performed and 
detailed monitoring to  ensure the terms of the contract are fulfilled. This process 
will before hand prevent any conflict upon other government policies. Further- 
more, this option will encourage more indigenous investors to participate in 
accelerating economic development is the country which is consistent with the 
new lending policy which has been adopted by the World Bank as explained 
in option 4. Therefore, the above analysis shows that this option is the most 
consistent among all other options. 
D. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY 
1 .  The Status Quo-Full Government Ownership 
The government will favor this option because changes are frought with a lot 
of uncertainties and risks. The government always has the concern and fear 
that the cost may outweigh the benefits for effecting changes. It considered 
the status quo offers a lot of stability. Through this option the government will 
continue to exercise control over this important public utility. By retaining the 
full government ownership over KTM, this will be a visible and excessive display 
evidence of the government's effort to develop the economy of the country. 
This Minister of Transport will support this option for not wanting its sphere 
of influence curtailed. The majority of the KTM workforce also prefer this 
option because they will be insecure if the status quo is changed. According to 
Professor Katz, "the process of changing carry a higher degree of risk and 
uncertainty for a correspondingly higher stakes.23 Since implementing other 
options are very likely to be met with resistance, this option has the highest 
political feasibility. 
2. Equal Between the Federal and Indigenous Private Enterprise Participation 
Politically, this option is not that favourable because the government may not 
have effective control over the KTM due to the divided loyalty among the KTM 
management and staff. Furthermore, it is likely that KTM management would 
team up against the government. Therefore, in terms of this criteria, this option 
is more feasible than the third option but less feasible than other options. 
3. Join-Venture Between a Federal Government and a Foreign Government 
This option has a higher probability of not being feasible politically. The Federal 
Government may not accept this option if there would be a drain to the foreign 
reserve and if the net benefit may not be to Malaysian favour. Another factor 
that lead to  Federal Government's rejection is the fear that this option may be 
viewed by the general public who may misunderstand the notion as a sell out 
and extension of imperialism or neocolonialism. The press and local enter- 
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preneurs may preach. a dissonance view about this option. Therefore, in terms of 
t of political feasibility criteria, this option is the least feasible. 
I 4. Privatization by Indigenous Private Investor with Government Regulation 
I Politically, it is feasible because the government can still exercise control 
without necessarily owning the enterprise. These control could be achieve 
through regulatory system. Also the government is very much aware of the 
fact that the democratic opposition is always and properly alert t o  opportunities 
to capitalise on shortcomings in government agency's performance. By trans- 
fering this KTM which has been degrading for a long time in terms of perfor- 
mance and productivity to a private's hand, the government will be released 
from the burden since this option retains government authority over KTM 
and at the same time released its financial obligations. To the KTM manage- 
ment and staff, the option is threatening. Thus, the political feasibility of 
this option will depend on the stakes that would accrue to them in terms of 
employment guatantees. Without a reasonable guarantee, the government may 
loose the political support from this group of people. 
5. Contracting Out to Indigenous Private Concern with a Provision of Greater 
I Autonomy The Ministry of Transport will support this option since the administrative 
1 arrangement still gives him the opportunity to interfere without accountability. 
1 
Just like the fourth option, there is very much likely to be same opposition 
from the existing railwaymen and staff, most of whom will either be rehired by 
I the contractors or retrenched. This opposition could be minimized by the Government if these problems envisaged are covered in the terms of the contract. 
Since the physical assets still belong to the government, we could assumed that 
the above contraint, could be tackled more easily through this option as 
compared to  the fourth option. Therefore, in terms of this criteria, this option 
is more feasible than the second, third and fourth options but less feasible 
! than the status quo option. 
E. ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY 
1. The Status Quo-Full Government Ownership 
I This option is rated poor in respect of ecomic feasibility, because the financial cost is too great and the inefficient services of KTM which does not help the 
I growing economy. In other words, the implementation of this option will cause 
! 
the government to loose a lot of money compared to the rate of return. Under 
the economic depression facing the country, the option is not economically 
8 feasible. 
b 
j Equal Between the Federal Government and Private Enterprise Participation Economically, it is feasible because the KTM in long run does not operate on 
t such deficit. The government does not have to  fund the KTM alone. The part 
of the money which are suppossed to be allocated to  the KTM could be used 
Z for other public projects. Therefore, this option is more economically feasible 
f compared to the first, third and fifth option. ! 
i 
t 
3. Joint-Venture Between Federal Government and Foreign Government 
This option is not economically feasible if we were to analyze to the present 
economic condition of the country with regard to foreign reserve. Indeed, 
foreign exchange is in acute short supply. In other words, since this option 
has the highest maximum demand for foreign exchange, it is the least feasible 
in terms of this criteria. 
4. Privatization by Indigenous Private Investor with Government Regulation 
Economically, it is very feasible because the government would be free from 
financing the KTM. Looking at the present situation, the financial cost is too 
great and the inefficient services of the KTM which does not help the growing 
economy and social demands leave much to be desired. Through this option 
the government will be released from the burden of the inherent costs in main- 
taining the railway system in Malaysia. Several well-publicized studies that seem 
to demonstrate that the private, profit-making sector can deliver services at a 
cost substantially below that of public. By these facts, this option is considered 
the most feasible in terms of this criteria. 
5.  Contracting Out to Indigenous Private Concern With a Provision of Great 
Autonomy 
Since the government still retain the ownership of the infrastructure, the finan- 
cial burden of the government will not be lessened to a greater extent. Con- 
tracting out still involves costs in government's administration and the contrac- 
tor's profit must be added to the government's cost of running the operation. 
Consequently, contracting for services by a private concern can be more expen- 
sive than public delivery. For these reasons this option is less economically 
feasible than the second and the fourth options but more feasible compared 
to the first and third option. 
F. ADMINISTRATIVE FEASIBILITY 
1. The Status Quo-Full Government Ownership 
The arbitrary constant changes in the executive and management robs the 
KTM of the continuity and reliability which any organization requires for 
success. Most, if not all, they do not possess first hand knowledge of business 
administration. Since under the present institutional administrative arrangement 
KTM does not meet the stated goals, this option is the least feasible in term of 
this criteria. 
2. Equal Between the Federal and Indigenous Private Enterprise Participation 
The ability of government to share the ownership of Malaysia Airline System 
support the administrative feasibility of this option. Since the partner will be 
the local business enterpreneur, this option is more feasible in terms of this 
criteria compared to the third option. However, there will be some difficulties 
that would ensue as a result of coordinating the government and private inves- 
tors' acticities and demand. 
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3. Joint-Venture Between Federal Government and a Foreign Government 
This option is ranked low in terms of administrative feasibility due to trouble- 
some that would follow subsequently as a result of coordinating the federal 
government and foreign government. The practicality and viability of this 
option is still doubtfull compared to the second, the fourth and the fifth option. 
Furthermore, the participating country would only participate when the terms 
are economically and politically favourable to them. However, since this option 
will likely bring in technical and administrative expertise in the KTM, it is more 
administratively feasible than the first option. 
4. Privatization by Indigenous Private Investor With Government Regulation 
There is an administrative feasibility to implement this option. Most importantly, 
there are indigenous private investors who would be intrested to be an owner 
of KTM. However, due to the finances involved and the state of the capital assets 
of KTM which are so deteriorating, the availabilily of the indigenous private 
concern that would purchase the KTM will not be as many as who would accept 
the contract in the case of the fifth option. Therefore, it is considered less 
feasible than the fifth option in regard of this criteria. 
5.  Contracting out to Indigenous Private Concern With a Provision of Greater 
Autonomy 
Since the capital assets still belong to the government, this option guaranteed 
government's support in the maintenance of those assets. This indicates that 
the risk involved are also minimal compared to  privatization. On these basis, 
this is the most feasible option in this respect. 
G. QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF THE POLICY 
OPTIONS 
Having analyzed each option with the specific criteria, it is necessary at this 
junture to compare the options and weigh them quantitatively in order to 
access their viability and practicality. The method used in this policy paper 
is called the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). This AHP is a systematic pro- 
cedure for representing the elements of any problem, hierarchichally. It organizes 
the basic rationality by breaking down a problem into its smaller and smaller 
constituent parts and then guides decision makers through a series of pairwise 
comparison jugdements to  express the relative strength or intensity of impact 
of the elements in the hierarchy. Then this judgement will be translated to 
numbers.24 
I In making subjective pairwise comparisons; the scale used is as follows:25 
Intensity 
of relative 
importance Definition Explaination 
1 Equal importance Two activities contribute equally to the 
objective. 
~ ~ , A N A I A I S I S  Jld. 1. Bil. 1.  t 
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgement slightly favor 
of one over another one activity over another. 
7 Demonstrated An activity is strongly favored and its 
importance dominance is demonstrated in practice 
9 Extreme importance The evidence favoring one activity 
over another is of the highest possible 
order of affirmation. 
2 ,4 ,6 ,8  Intermediate values When compromise is needed 
between the two 
adjacent judgements 
Reciprocal If an activity has 
of above one of the above numbers (e.g. 3) compared with a second activity, 
non-zero then the second activity has the reciprocal value (113) when 
numbers. compared to the first. 
It will be useful to summarize the steps followed in the A H P . ~ ~  
1. Define the problem and determine what we want to know. 
2. Structure the hierarchy from the top (the objectives from my viewpoint) 
through the intermediate levels (criteria on which subsequent levels depend) 
to the lowest (which is the list of my policy options( (Appendix 3). 
A set of pairwise comparison matrices are set for each of the lower levels - one 
matrix for each element in the level immediately above. This yields a square 
matrix judgements. The pairwise comparisons are done in terms of which 
element in the level immediately above. This yields a square matrix judgements. 
The pairwise comparisons are done in terms of which element donimates the 
other. These judgements are then expressed as integers. For example, if option 
1 dominates option 2 then the whole number is entered in row option 1, column 
option 2 and the reciprocal (fraction) is entered in row option 2, column option 
1. If option 1 and 2 or option 3 and option 4 are judged to be equal, a one is 
assigned to both options. 
4. After I have made all pairwise comparisons and all the data have been entered, 
the consistency is determined using eigenvalue. 
5.  Steps 3 and 4 are performed for all levels and clusters in the hierarchy (see 
Appendix 4,5,6,7,8,9,10).  
6. Hierarchical synthesis is then used to weight the eighenvectors by weight of 
the criteria and the sum is taken overal weighted eigen venctor entries cor- 
responding to those in the next lower of the hierarchy (See Appendix 11). 
H, INTERPRETATION OF THE ANALYTICAL HIERARCHICAL PROCESS 
Appendix 11 shows the hierarchical synthesis to get the overall ranking of 
the options suggested in this policy paper. From the analysis and synthesis 
the fourth option has the highest scores (with 0.437), and this is followed by 
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the fifth option (with 0.303 points), the second option (0.119) points), the 
status quo option (0.083) options), and the third option (0.058 points). 
What this synthesis tells us is that full privatization by indigenous private inves- 
tor with government control has the highest score and the lowest score of 
the third option which is a joint venture between the Federal Government 
and Foreign Government. Indeed, even though there is dissatisfaction with 
the status quo, it is not the least favorable option. 
I. RECOMMENDATION 
In view of the detailed analysis of the advantages and the disadvantages of each 
policy option based on the specific criteria selected, full privatization by indi- 
genous private investor with government regulation (option 4) appear to be 
the best option that meets the goals and objectives of the policy and of the 
KTM. It is therefore recommended that option 4 be adopted. 
I J.  IMPLEMENTATION 
This study is very well aware of the fact that the KTM is the largest public 
corporation in which millions of Ringgit is involved. It is also aware of the 
government's policy of encouraging local business to invest in the country. 
The recommended option involves changes in the legal status of the KTM with 
attended changes in personnel and procedure. 
The transfer of the KTM to private owners will therefore have to be gradual and 
in phases. The following steps are suggested: 
Phase 1 
a. The determination to contract the KTM should be followed by advertise- 
ments into the local media. This advertisement should specify the condi- 
tions to be met and call for the interested bidders. It is important that the 
conditions could be both feasible and attractive to the private inverstors. 
b. A body consisting of representatives of Ministries of Transport, Finance, 
Trade and Industry and Board of Directors KTM should be constituted to 
screen the competing bidders. The board is to determine the financial bidders. 
The board is to determine the financial capability, managerial and technical 
capacity of each bidder. Since foreign exchange is a factor constraint, any 
investor with good foreign accounts and which has capacity to utilize local 
skills and materials would have added advantage. 
Phase 2 
The respective bidders would be required to make presentations to the board. 
The aim is to clarify certain issues which are not made clear in the biddings.. 
Phase 3 
Based on the presentations made by bidders, at least 3 of them should be 
selected. It is with these 3 bidders that the final negotiation of the contract 
would be made. Three bidders are selected to make the final selection more 
competitive and guard against unexpected withdrawal of any two bidders at the 
I 
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last minute. Full negotiation is to be carried out with these bidders. 
Phase 4 
a. Selection of the private investor who should own KTM should be made based 
on the cost-benefit analysis and the most likelihood of meeting the goals and 
objectives of the policy option. This phase will include drafting and signing of 
the legal agreement document by the private owner and government repre- 
sentatives regarding the rulings that must be followed by the owner. 
b. The board is to negotiate with new owner the transfer ownership. The govem- 
ment could accept monthly or annual payments of agreed amount from the 
owners until everything is paid or the new owners may make a substantial 
down payment followed by installments for the rest. This depends on the 
financial stand of the new owners but largely on the letter of agreement. 
c. It is suggested that whatever method is adopted there should be a reasonable 
period of grace, i.e 2 years minimum, to allow the new owners to settle down. 
Phase 5 
a. The agreement should in additional deal with the future of the present KTM 
senior staff and employees. It is suggested that the new owners should take 
over the top management position first. The middle and lower level manage- 
ment, together with all the staff will continue to work for a period of time 
until the new owners find their substitutes. Their substitution should be on 
grounds of cause only, not on victimization. 
b. Measure should be taken to ensure a smooth transition from the present 
status quo arrangement to the recommended option. 
c. Complete ownership should follow immediately and this is likely to be fully 
completed in 6 months or more to allow understudy. 
K. MONITORING AND EVALUATION !a 
This policy should be monitored on a regular basis. The purpose of monitoring 
is to ensure that the policy option adopted is being implemented according to 
ther terms and spirit of the privatization rules and procedures. By regular moni- 
toring it would be possible to  detect problems and correct them early before 
they wreck the option. Therefore, in the process of monitoring and evaluating 
this policy, it is important not to look at the results only, but also to monitor 
how the recommendation is being implemented as it goes along. Virtually this 
policy has both anticipated and unanticipated consequences. The unanticipated 
consequences rarely come out exactly as we anticipated they would, but some- 
times they are not too far from the mark. By monitcring intended and 
unintended consequences of the option, it could be detected and corrected. 
Monitoring is very necessary, more especially in privatization the KTM due to 
the problems of implementation. 
Evaluation of the success and failure of the option would be done based on the 
degree to which the goals and objectives earlier are satisfied. This can be done by 
the following instruments: , 
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a. Cost-benefit analysis 
b. Effectiveness analysis 
c. Survey to determine customer's satisfaction and other social benefits. 
d. Comparison between the recommended option and the present system of 
operation to determine the variations; i.e. how better or worse the goals and 
objectives are being achieved. 
Therefore, the government should set up a monitoring and evaluation machinery. 
This body should be given the power and the independence to be able to  carry 
out the tasks. 
CONCLUSION 
In a country that is fast industrialising and a society that is growing in affluence, 
the development of the various modes of transportatoion is very necessary to meet the 
needs of the 21 st century. There is a pressing need now to have an effective and 
efficient rail system to cater for the growing demand of the nation's economy. With 
its capacity problems and inadequate infrastructure, KTM has to embark on conside- 
rable changes to prepare itself for the increasing role that it is need to perform in the 
future. 
KTM as a public sector enterprise had functioned with a certain degree of 
rigidity in regard to financial resources. Government was the only source that was 
accessible t o  the KTM and financial allocations were controlled by Governmental 
regulations. This lack of resources was one of the main causes for neglect of repairs, 
maintenance and rehabilitation. The present institutional administrative arrangement 
impedes the effectiveness and efficiency of the KTM. The management system lacks 
accountability, stability, realiability and continuity which are essential attributes t o  
any successful commercial venture. The various measures taken in the past did not 
yield any fruitful results. 
In this study, five options were analyzed in the light of effectiveness, efficiency, 
consistency, political, economic, and administrative feasibilities. It is believed that 
full private ownership by indigenous private investors with government control is 
most likely to inject a sense of business and accountability in the KTM. This con- 
sequently will improve its services, make it financially viable and a source of revenue 
to the government through corporate tax. In addition, it would relieve the govern- 
ment of unnecessary financial expense. 
APPENDIX 1 
Statement Of Delays Of KTM Passenger Trains (%) 
Years 1983 
ARRIVE ON DELA Y DELA Y DELA Y DELA Y DELA Y 
MON. TIME 1 - 10 MIN. 11 - 20  MLV. 21 - 3 0  MIN. 30 - 60  MZN. MORE THAN 60  MIN. 
FEB. 24.46 17.14 12.86 8.75 16.79 20.00 
MAR. 32.74 21.12 16.77 10.16 10.00 9.19 
APR. 1733 18.16 14.50 13.00 19.84 17.16 
MAY 33.10 25.97 15.58 7.90 10.58 10.58 
JUNE 33.89 17.70 15.52 9.69 12.18 11.01 
A UG. 35.81 22.91 14.35 7.41 11.78 7.75 
SEPT. 28.26 15.38 1337 10.53 18.06 14.04 
r( 
OCT. 31.39 13.91 14.23 9.38 16.34 14.72 
a m NOV. 18.66 15.50 9.66 9.33 20.33 26.50 
,- DEC. 39.67 18.06 12.25 6.61 . 10.32 13.06 
'SOURCE: Diplomat, Feb. 1984, p. 12 
APPENDIX 2 ORGANlZATIONAL CHART OF 
MALAYAN RAILWAY ADMINISTRATION 
General Manager - Ra~lway Board 
Deputy General 
Training Administration 
Commercial Store Communication 
Mechanical Engineering 
APPENDIX 3 
TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF KTM 
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JUDGMENTS WITH RESPEQ TO 
EFFECTIVENESS < GOAL 
STA. QUO GOV & PRI GOV & FOR PRIVATE CONTRACT 
Matrix entry indicates that ROW element is ................... 
1 EQUALLY 3 MODERATELY 5 STRONGLY 7 VERY STRONGLY 9 EXTREMLY 
more IMPORTANT than COLUMN element unless enclosed in parenthiesis. 
STA. QUO : STA.QU0 
GOV&PRI : GOV&PRI 
GOV & FOR : GOV& FOR 
PRNATE : PRIVATE 
CONTRACT : CONTRACT 
0.039 
STA. QUO XXXXX 
0.111 
GOV & PRI XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.079 
GOV & FOR XXXXXXXXXXX 
0.505 
PRIVATE V m -  
0.265 
CONTRACT XXXXXXXX- 
INCONSISTENCY RATIO = 0.120 
s 
I 6 6 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 1 8  M. 1. BU. 1. 
I 
I 
I JUDGMENTS WITH RESPECT TO 
I EFFECTIVENESS < COAL 
i STA. QUO GOV & PRI GOV & FOR , 
i STA. QUO GOV & PRI 
GOV & FOR 
PRIVArE 
CONTRACT 
Matrix entry indicates that ROW element is ................... 
1 EQUALLY 3 MODERATELY 5 STRONGLY 7 VERYSTRONGLY 9 EXTREMLY 
mom IMPORTANT than COLUMN element unless enclosed in parenthesis. 
SPA.QUO : STA. QUO 
GOV&PRI : GOV&PRI 
GOV & FOR : COV& FOR 
PRNATE : PRIVATE 
CONTRACT : CONTRACT 
0.061 
=A. QUO XXXXXXXX 
0.112 
COV & PRI XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.033 





INCONSISTENCY RATIO = 0.089 
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APPENDIX 6 
JUDGMENTS WITH RESPECT TO 
ADiMlNISTRATIVE FEASIBILITY < GOAL 
STA. QUO GOV & PRI GOV & FOR PRIVATE CONT1UCT 
STA. QUO 
GOV & PRI 
GOV & FOR 
PRNATE 
CONTRACT 
Matrix entry indicates that ROW element is ................... 
1 EQUALLY 3 MODERATELY 5 STRONGLY 7 VERY STRONGLY 9 EXTREMLY 
more IMPORTANT than COLUMN element unless enclosed in parenthesis. 
STA.QU0 : STA.QU0 
GOV&PRI : GOV&PRI 
GOV& FOR : GOV& FOR 
PRNATE : PRIVATE 
CONTRACT : CONTRACT 
0.038 
STA. QUQ XXXXXX 
0.139 
GOV & PRI XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.076 
GOV & FOR XXXXXXXXXXX 
0.271 
PRIVATE XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
INCONSISTENCY RATIO = 0.082 
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APPENDIX 7 
JUDGMENTS WITH RESPECT TO 
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY < GOAL 
STA. QUO CONTRACT PROV ATE GOV & PRI 
STA. QUO 3 .O 5 .O 5 .O 
CONTRACT 3.0 5 .O 
PRNATE 3 .O 
GIV & PRI 
COV & FOR 
Matrix entry indicates that ROW element is .............,..... 
1 EQUALLY 3 MODERATELY 5 STRONGLY 7 VERY STRONGLY 9 EXTREMLY 
more IMPORTANT than COLUMN element unless enclosed in parenthesis. 
STA.QU0 : STA.QU0 
COV &PRI : COV&PRI 
COV& FOR : GOV& FOR 
PRIVATE : PRIVATE 
CONTRACT : CONTRACT 
0.479 








COV & FOR XXXXXX 
INCONSISTENCY RATIO = 0.083 
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APPENDIX 8 
JUDGMENTS WITH RESPECT TO 
ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY < GOAL 
STA. QUO GOV & PRI GOV & FOR PRIVATE CONTRACT 
CONTRACT 
Matrix entry indicates that ROW element b ................... 
1 EQUALLY 3 MODERATELY 5 STRONGLY 7 VERY STRONGLY 9 EXTREMLY 
more MPORTANT than COLUMN element unless enclosed in parenthesis. 
STA. QUO : STA. QUO 
GOV & PRI : GOV Sr PRI 
GOV& FOR : GOV& FOR 
PRNATE : PRIVATE 
CONTRACT : CONTRACT 
STA. QUO XXXXXXXXX 
GOV & PRI X X X X X X X X X X X ~ X X X X  
GOV & FOR XXXXX 
CONTRACT XXXXXXXXXXXXXXIMXX 
INCONSISTENCY RATIO = 0.059 
L 
JUDGhENTS WITH RESPECT TO 
CONSISTENCY <f GOAL 
sTA. QUO GOV & PRI GOV & FOR 
sm QUO 
W V  & PRl 
COV h FOR 
PRIVATE 
CONTRACT 
Matsix entry indicates that ROW element i s  ................... 
1 EQUALLY 3 MODERATELY 5 STRONGLY 7 VERY STRONGLY 9 EXTReMLY 
mcue IMPORTANT than COLUMN element unlear enclomd in parenthesis. 
STA. QUO : STA.QU0 
COV&PRI : GOV&PRI 
GOV &FOR : GOV& FOR 
PRIVATE : PRIVATE 
CONTRACT : CONTRACT 
0.078 
STA. QUO XXXXXXXXXXXX 
0.129 
W V  & PRl XXXXXMXXXXXM(XXXXXX 
0.034 
CQV& FOR XXXXX 
0.288 
PRIVATE X X X X X M X X X X X X X X ~ X X ~ X X X X X X  
0.470 
CONTRACT X X X X X M ~ ~ ~ X X X X ~ X X X X >  
lNCONSISTENCY RATIO = 0.076 
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APPENDIX 10 
TO IMPROVE THE EFFEClWENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF KTM 
TALLY FOR SYNTHESIS OF LEAF NODES WITH RESPECT TO GOAL 
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APPENDIX 1 1 
TO IMPROVE THE EFFECLWENES AND EFFICIENCY OF KTM 
SYNTHESIS OF LEAF NODES 
WITH RESPECT TO COAL 
OVERALL MCONSISTENCY lNDEX = 0.09 
PRNATE 0.437 M X X X X X X X X X X X M X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ~ .  
CONTRACT 0.303 P X X M m M U ( X  
GOVhPRl 0.119 XXXXMXXXXXXXXXXX 
SI'A. QUO 0.083 -W 
GOV 8 FOR 0.058 MXXXXXX I 
CONTRACT --- CONTRACT 
GOV& FOR --- GOV 8 FOR 
GOVBPRl --- GOV & PRI 
PRIVATE --- PRIVATE 
STA.QU0 --- STA. QUO 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Frank, C. Jr: Public and Private Enterprises in Developing Countries, Yale Univer- 
sity Press, New Haven, 1971, p. 88 - 125 
2. Ibid, p. 8 8  - 125 
3. This model was explained in detailed by Herbers Morrison in his book, Socializa- 
tion and Transport, (2nd. Editon). Oxford University Press, London, 1960, 
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